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1 Introduction
It is nearly universally accepted, by philosophers and common opinion alike, that
the giving and receiving of valid consent is normatively transformative: A’s validly
consenting to B’s φ-ing changes the normative situation from its being impermis-
sible for B to φ before A consents to its being permissible for B to φ after A has
consented. The idea that consent has this normatively transformative power is
prominent in bioethics and in the ethics of health-care more generally (including
biomedical and psychological research) and it also plays a central role in discus-
sions of sexual ethics and in various areas of political and legal theory.
I have two independent but related aims in this paper. The first, which is
a fairly modest aim, is to present some considerations that provide at least a
presumptive case in favour of what I will call Mental State Views of Consent.
The second, more ambitious aim, is to challenge the idea that consent has, or
indeed can have, the normatively transformative power that most people as-
sume it has. At first glance it may seem obvious that an agent’s consenting to
the performance of an action by another agent can, and does, alter the norma-
tive status of that action, but on reflection it is philosophically puzzling how
this can be. First, those who endorse the idea that consent is normatively trans-
formative must identify a range of possible actions which is such that actions in
that range are impermissible before consent and permissible after consent. I will
argue that is no easy task. Second, how is it that, simply by consenting to the
performance of an action, φ, an agent can reshape the balance of reasons for or
against the performance of φ? In general, for any action, φ, to which consent
may be granted or withheld, there are antecedent, consent-independent, reasons
for and/or against the performance of φ; i.e. there are reasons that obtain prior
to, and independently of, an agent’s consenting to someone’s performance of φ.
It is puzzling how an agent’s consenting can add or subtract to those antecedent
reasons. The second aim of this paper is to articulate and defend these objections
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to the assumed normatively transformative power of consent. I will also explore
various responses to them. As far as I can tell, even if I fail to achieve the more
modest aim (to show that there is good reason to believe that a Mental State view
of consent is correct), that failure has no obvious bearing on the success or failure
of the more ambitious aim since it is perfectly coherent to agree with everything I
say in the second part whilst strongly disagreeing with what I say in the first part.
In the first half of this paper I will use John Kleinig’s theory of consent as a foil for
arguing for a Mental State view of consent and for setting the stage for part two
where I argue that consent is not necessarily normatively transformative; that, on
the contrary, consent is necessarily not normatively transformative.
2 What is Consent?
What is it to consent? Throughout this paper, for simplicity, I will make a number
of assumptions. First, I will assume that the standard consent relation is [A con-
sents to B’s φ-ing]. Second, I will assume that A and B are separate persons –
indeed that A and B are agents: they have a general capacity to form and act on
what they believe to be normative considerations. Third, I will assume that A and
B are individuals – i.e. that A and B are not corporate entities. Finally, I will as-
sume that ‘φ’ stands for actions only.
With these assumptions in place we can say that there are, broadly, two
kinds of views about what consent is:
1. Mental State Views of Consent: To consent is to be in a certain state of mind.
One such view is represented by Peter Westen who says that to consent is to be
in ‘ . . . a state of mind of acquiescence . . . a felt willingness to agree with – or
to choose – what another person seeks or proposes.’1 Other Mental State theo-
rists may disagree and argue that being in some other specific state of mind
should be identified with consenting. Yet other theorists may hold that there is
a range of mental states that are such that being in any one of them constitutes
consenting.2 These kinds of views should be distinguished from
1 Peter Westen, The Logic of Consent: The Diversity and Deceptiveness of Consent as a Defense
to Criminal Conduct (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003), p. 5.
2 There is of course a big difference between believing that to consent is to φ (where this is
the ‘is’ of identity) and believing that to consent is constituted by φ-ing. Nonetheless, for sim-
plicity, I will use the two expressions interchangeably unless I explicitly say different.
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2. Communicative Act Views of Consent: To consent is to engage in a particular
communicative act.
A strong version of this view is represented by John Kleinig who says that
‘Consent is centrally and most appropriately a communicative act that serves to
alter the moral relations in which A and B stand – and that for the moral rela-
tions to have been altered for B, a communicative act must have occurred.’3
Communicative Act theorists may of course also have different views about
which particular communicative act one has to perform in order to consent. They
may also deny the claim that acts of consent are necessarily normatively transfor-
mative. As with Mental State views one could also, as Kleinig does, hold the view
that there’s a range of communicative acts that are such that performing any one
of them constitutes consent: ‘The form taken by the act of consent may vary con-
siderably, though it will commonly be constituted by some gesture, word, or
other recordable behavior that conventionally and contextually expresses it.’4 In
this paper I will assume that these kinds of theories of consent are mutually ex-
clusive and jointly exhaustive. If this assumption is correct, and given the as-
sumption that there really are instances of consent, an argument against either
kind of view will ipso facto be an argument in favour of the other kind of view.
Before I go on to present my argument against Communicative Act views –
and thus, given the assumption above, in favour of a Mental State view – I
need to point out an important distinction that cuts across the Mental State/
Communicative Act distinction and which complicates things. This is the dis-
tinction between conceptual/semantic views about what ‘consent’ means and
metaphysical views about what consent is. Consider the following passage from
Kleinig:
Consent is not a neutral act that is then separately justified as having normative force,
but is normative through and through even though it also has a descriptive content. To
say that A consented to φ is not to report some evaluatively neutral doing, such as A’s
saying ‘yes,’ which is then to be followed by further discussion about the significance of
saying ‘yes.’ Instead, it is intended to convey that whatever it was that A did to consent
(including, perhaps, saying ‘yes’), it also possessed a certain normative force.’5
(My italics.)
3 John Kleinig, ‘The Nature of Consent’ in Franklin Miller and Alan Wertheimer (eds), The
Ethics of Consent: Theory and Practice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 4.
4 Ibid., p. 11.
5 Ibid., p. 5.
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Contrast this with the following passage from Tom Beauchamp:
‘Consent,’ ‘the obligation to obtain consent,’ and ‘the right to consent’ are strikingly dif-
ferent notions. . . . ‘The obligation to obtain consent’ and ‘the right to consent’ . . . are
moral notions, but . . . ‘consent’ [is] not obviously [a] moral [notion]. It seems a matter of
fact (or perhaps of metaphysics or the philosophy of mind), not a matter of ethics or
value, whether one . . . consents.’6 (My italics.)
These views differ in at least three respects; the most important for present pur-
poses is that, on Kleinig’s view, it is conceptually necessary – i.e. true in virtue
of meaning – that if A consents to B’s φ-ing, then A has performed a communi-
cative act that transforms the shape of the normative situation. This view, then,
essentially contains the following three claims:
(i) To consent is to perform a communicative act
(ii) Consent is necessarily normatively transformative
(iii) (i) and (ii) are conceptual truths.
If I’ve understood him correctly, Beauchamp denies all three of these claims. I
think he is right in doing so. Let us start with claim (iii).
According to this claim, it is analytically true that consent consists in per-
forming a communicative act which is such that when performed it necessarily
transforms the normative situation. Of course, it is perfectly possibly to agree with
(i) and (ii) and reject (iii). In other words, it is perfectly coherent to think that to
consent is to perform a communicative act which is necessarily normatively trans-
formative and deny that this is guaranteed by semantic fiat. So what’s wrong with
(iii)? Taking our lead from G. E. Moore and his Open Question Argument we can
argue that if we endorse a view like Kleinig’s we commit ourselves to holding that
someone who sincerely asks questions like
A consented to B’s φ-ing, but did A communicate this (to B)?
and
A consented to B’s φ-ing, but did this change the normative shape of the situation?
is not a competent user of ‘consent’. However, there seems to be no conceptual
confusion involved in asking these questions – these questions appear to be, in
Moore’s words ‘open questions’.7 If someone can ask questions like these without
6 Tom Beauchamp, ‘Autonomy and Consent’, in Franklin Miller and Alan Wertheimer (eds),
The Ethics of Consent: Theory and Practice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 56.
7 See G.E. Moore, Principia Ethica, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1903; revised edi-
tion with “Preface to the second edition” and other papers, T. Baldwin (ed.), Cambridge:
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conceptual confusion ‘consent’ does not conceptually entail either (i) or (ii). The
soundness of the Open Question Argument as a test for synonymy or conceptual
entailment has of course been challenged8 but even if the argument above fails
to demonstrate conclusively that ‘consent’ does not entail (i) and (ii) at the very
least it forces those who endorse a conceptual entailment view to explain why
questions like the ones above appear open. Without such an explanation there is
good reason to be suspicious of views according to which ‘consent’ conceptually
entails things like (i) and (ii) – i.e. without such an explanation there is good rea-
son to reject (iii).
A more plausible Communicative Act theory denies the conceptual entail-
ment claim and runs the story via metaphysical necessity instead.9 On such a
view, it is metaphysically, but not conceptually, necessary that A’s consenting
entails that (i) A has performed a communicative act and (ii) A’s consenting
necessarily transforms the shape of the normative situation.10 I will argue that
a correct view of consent entails neither of these things since consent is not
constituted by a communicative act and consent is not necessarily normatively
transformative – in fact, it is necessarily not normatively transformative. I will
end this section by arguing against the idea that consenting is performing a
communicative act. The claim that consent is necessarily normatively transfor-
mative will be the focus of the next section.
What reason is there to believe that to consent is to perform a communica-
tive act? Recall that Kleinig says: ‘ . . . consent is centrally and most appropri-
ately a communicative act that serves to alter the moral relations in which A
and B stand – and that for the moral relations to have been altered for B, a com-
municative act must have occurred.’ I will assume that thoughts like these pro-
vide the main motivation behind Communicative Act views. The general line of
reasoning seems to be that
1. If A consents to B’s φ-ing then the moral relations between A and B have
changed for B (and A) in virtue of A’s consenting.
Cambridge University Press, 1993 (page references in this entry are to the revised edition),
pp 62–69.
8 See W.K. Frankena, ‘The Naturalistic Fallacy’,Mind, Vol. 48, No. 192 (Oct., 1939), pp. 464–477
9 Issues are further complicated by the fact that it is possible to hold views according to
which one of the elements is entailed by conceptual necessity and the other element isn’t.
Setting this complication to the side, we should note that if conceptual necessity entails meta-
physical necessity, any argument that has force against views which connect consent and nor-
matively transformative communicative actions via metaphysical necessity will ipso facto have
force against views which attempt to do it via conceptual necessity.
10 A familiar parallel here is the view that although ‘Water’ does not mean ‘H2O’, water is
H2O.
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2. The moral relations between A and B have changed for B in virtue of A’s
consenting only if B is aware of A’s consent.
3. B is aware of A’s consent only if A communicates A’s consent to B.
So,
4. A consents to B’s φ-ing only if A communicates A’s consent to B.
5. A communicates A’s consent to B only if A performs a communicative act.
So,
6. A consents to B’s φ-ing only if A performs a communicative act.11
If this is correct, then to the extent that Communicative Act views are motivated
by an argument of this kind, such views are not well-motivated since the argu-
ment is unsound. Premise 1 will be the focus of the next section. Although
premise 3 is certainly questionable,12 I shall focus my attention on premise 2.
Premise 2 says that the moral relations between A and B change for B in
virtue of A’s consenting only if B is aware of A’s consent. As a general view
about the nature of moral relations this is patently false. Changes in moral rela-
tions is one thing and people being aware of those changes is another. If B be-
comes aware of the fact that the moral relations between him and A have
changed, then what B becomes aware of (that the moral relations between him
and A have changed) is something that occurred prior to, and independently of,
his becoming aware of it. If this were not the case, then what is it that B be-
comes aware of? So moral relations between A and B can change without A and
B being aware of this. To illustrate: Suppose, plausibly enough, that we are
morally obliged to have a special concern for the wellbeing of our close friends.
A and B are best friends. For some reason A does something that constitutes a
serious breach of that friendship. The breach is so serious that it constitutes a
11 Support for the idea that something like this argument lies behind Communicative Act views
(and certainly behind Kleinig’s view) is provided by Kleinig himself who says: ‘The position that
I articulate and defend . . . is that there is always an expressive dimension to consent – that
consent must be signified – and that only if consent takes the form of a communicative act can
the moral relations between A and B be transformed. Absent such communication, B has no
business doing that for which A’s consent is needed even if A condones or would acquiesce to it.
Consent is a social act in which A conveys something to B – something that, once communicated
. . . now gives B a moral right or entitlement that B previously lacked.’ Op. Cit., p. 10.
12 Why suppose that B is aware of A’s consent only if A communicates A’s consent to B? To
do so is arguably question-begging against Mental State views. Suppose consent consists in
being in a particular mental state. For some states of mind, it seems possible to know that a
person is in that state of mind without them having communicated that state of mind to us.
But if this is so, why couldn’t the state of mind which constitutes consent be such a state of
mind?
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betrayal of their friendship. In addition A is also completely unrepentant about
this betrayal. Unfortunately for B, in addition to A’s betrayal, B is unaware of it.
A has violated a serious moral obligation he had to B, and on any sensible view
of friendship A is no longer B’s friend – let alone best friend (although B will no
doubt still believe that A is). As a result B is no longer bound by the obligations
of friendship and is no longer obliged to have a special concern for A’s well-
being. In light of this Premise 2 looks highly implausible.
But perhaps, although it’s true in general that moral relations can change
without people normatively affected by that change realising it, consent is dif-
ferent in this respect? Perhaps consent is such that it can work its ‘moral magic’
(to use Heidi Hurd’s phrase13) only if it is communicated? Kleinig says:
What is critical [for consent] is that A communicates with B such that B knows that A has
authorized B to φ. Consent requires signification – not in the sense that a state of mind is
reported but in the sense that a right or entitlement is created or permission given or obli-
gation assumed. Consent is not about agreeing with but to, and the latter, as a morally
transformative act, requires signification.14
But this again prompts the question: why can’t A create a right or entitlement
or give permission to B without B knowing that such a right or entitlement has
been created, or that such a permission has been given? After all, a legislative
body can create legal rights and entitlements for me without my knowing that it
has done so. If and when I become aware of the fact that such a legal right or
entitlement has been created (and that I now have such a right or entitlement)
what I become aware of is something that is true independently of me being
aware of it. The same is true for moral rights and entitlements.
Let us relate this back to consent. Consider the following case. The only
means you and I have of communicating is by writing handwritten letters and
posting them. You write me a letter asking for permission to come and stay at
my house in two weeks’ time. I receive the letter and read it on Monday. The
same day I write a response saying you are more than welcome to stay at my
place. I post the letter on Monday evening. You receive the letter on Wednesday
and you read it then, finding out that I’m happy for you to stay at my place.
Everyone can agree that I have consented to your staying at my house, but
when did I so consent? On the Monday or the Wednesday? It seems obvious that
I consented on Monday and that you found out about my consenting on the
13 See her ‘The Moral Magic of Consent’ in Legal Theory, 2 (1996), pp 121–146.
14 Op. Cit., p. 11.
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Wednesday. Kleinig, it seems to me, would have to say that I consented on the
Wednesday. This rings false. Insofar as Communicative Act views are motivated by
the idea that the essence of consent is to create, and impart knowledge of, permis-
sions (etc.), then to this extent such views should be rejected. We need to ask our-
selves what is lost if we draw a distinction between consenting on the one hand,
and communicating that consent on the other? My contention is that the answer is
‘nothing’. The central problem for Communicate Act views as I see it is that they
cannot allow for cases of uncommunicated consent. It seems a patient can consent
to an operation but be unable to communicate this to the surgeon – perhaps her
cognitive faculties are in full working order, but she is paralysed and cannot
speak. Another scenario is where a potential research subject fills out a consent
form but the form is lost before it reaches the researcher or the relevant ethics com-
mittee. These seem like genuine possibilities, but it’s very difficult to see how a
Communicate Act view can allow for such cases. I think that in the end we do
better to reject Communicative Act views of consent.
3 Why Consent is Not Normatively Transformative
As we saw earlier, Kleinig’s view has three central elements to it: (i) To consent
is to perform a communicative act; (ii) Consent is necessarily normatively trans-
formative, and (iii) The two previous claims are conceptual truths. So far, I
have argued against (i) and (iii). In the remainder of this paper I will argue
against (ii). Before I do this I need to say something about the distinction be-
tween consent and valid consent. Just what valid consent is thought to amount
to will emerge presently, but for now we need to recognise that in order for this
distinction to be of any use, there must be clear possible (at least) cases of non-
valid, or invalid, consent. Most people when they talk about valid consent have
in mind instances where someone consents and that person satisfies certain
conditions, call them C. Conversely, invalid consent is consent that is given
without C having been satisfied. Importantly, on such views, consent is norma-
tively transformative if and only if it is valid. Others, like Kleinig, have a differ-
ent view. On this view, if someone fails to satisfy C, they simply fail to consent.
On this view all consent is valid consent and there is no such thing as invalid
consent. As Kleinig puts it: ‘ . . . invalid consent no more counts as consent
than an invalid vote counts as a vote.’15 This remark helps us understand why
15 Ibid., p. 15.
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Kleinig thinks that consent is necessarily normatively transformative. Since there
is no such thing as invalid consent, if some (communicative) act fails to be nor-
matively transformative, that act is simply not an act of consent full stop. We
should reject this view. Consider again the analogy with the invalid vote. A more
accurate analogy is provided by the distinction between valid and invalid argu-
ments. Both kinds of arguments are genuine instances of arguments (at least up
to a limit), but only the former has any chance of being imbued with normative
force. If one endorses a ‘normativised’ theory of consent, like Kleinig’s, the nor-
matively transformative power of consent comes for free, but it does so at the
price of having a seriously extensionally inadequate theory of consent. This is
not a price worth paying.
We can put this debate to the side and focus on the fact that there is near
universal agreement that certain conditions (‘C’ as I referred to them above)
have to be met in order for someone’s consent to be valid (or, in Kleinig’s
terminology, for someone’s act to be an instance of consent) and thus for it
to be normatively transformative. Although theorists disagree about the de-
tails of these conditions – about how many conditions there are and what
exactly their content is – there seems to be a consensus that A is in a position
to validly consent to B’s φ-ing if and only if A satisfies the following three
conditions:
1. The competence condition
A’s general cognitive and emotional abilities at the time of consenting are
‘sufficiently mature’ and they are not at the time of consenting impaired by
conditions like being depressed, seriously intoxicated, in excruciating
pain, agitated, and irritable, etc.
2. The knowledge condition
A has sufficient knowledge of all the facts that are relevant to B’s φ-ing.
(What is the purpose of B’s φ-ing? How is B’s φ-ing related to that purpose?
What are the potential payoffs and risks of B’s φ-ing?)16
3. The voluntariness condition
A is not being coerced, unduly persuaded, or manipulated. (A’s assenting
to B’s φ-ing must be above the threshold of voluntariness.)
16 I take the knowledge condition to subsume what is sometimes called ‘The intention condi-
tion’ – roughly, the condition that A assents to B’s φ-ing under a certain description of B’s φ-
ing. When I let you borrow my hammer, I’m not letting you borrow an offensive weapon. I also
take the knowledge condition to subsume what is sometimes called ‘The disclosure condi-
tion’ – roughly, that B discloses to A all relevant information he is in possession of.
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So A is in a position to validly consent to B’s φ-ing if and only if these condi-
tions obtain, and if A is in this position and does consent, it is argued, his so
doing transforms the normative situation. In the rest of this paper I will drop
‘valid’ and only use it when context requires it. So what, then, is supposed to
happen, normatively speaking, when A consents? Those who believe that con-
sent is normatively transformative will endorse what I will call
The Transformation Thesis (T):
Necessarily, A’s validly consenting to B’s φ-ing changes the situation from there being
decisive reason for B not to φ before A consents to its not being the case that there is deci-
sive reason for B not to φ after A consents.17 (There is decisive reason for someone to φ
just in case the balance of total reasons for and/or against φ-ing favours φ-ing.)
Everyone agrees that in order for T to be plausible the acts that ‘φ’ ranges over
must be restricted in certain ways. For example, it can never be the case that
there is decisive reason for B to make A his slave, or to kill A for some trivial
reason. So A cannot validly consent to becoming B’s slave or to allow B to kill
him for some trivial reason. If B’s φ-ing is consent-independently impermissi-
ble, then A’s consenting to B’s φ-ing cannot make it permissible.18 Are further
restrictions necessary? To answer this, consider the following case
Tattoo
B approaches A and asks if A is interested in getting a large facial tattoo. A is made aware
of all the following salient facts about the procedure and outcome: 1. The procedure will be
very expensive. 2 It will be very painful. 3. The tattoo will be ugly and permanent. 4. The
tattoo will cause friends and family serious discomfort. 5. A will enjoy wearing it for only a
very short period. 6. B will be slightly better off financially by tattooing A. A consents.
17 This idea is frequently spelled out in terms of moral permissibility:
A’s consenting to B’s φ-ing changes the situation from its being morally impermissible
for B to φ before
A consents to its being morally permissible for B to φ after A consents.
From this idea, we can derive T via the two very plausible principles
Necessarily, if it is morally impermissible for B to φ then there is decisive reason for B
not to φ
Necessarily, if it is morally permissible for B to φ then it is not the case that there is
decisive reason for B not to φ
18 In a legal context A’s (validly) consenting to B’s φ-ing can change the legal permissibility
of B’s φ-ing. And just like in the moral case, if B’s φ-ing is consent-independently legally im-
permissible, A’s consenting to B’s φ-ing cannot make B’s φ-ing legally permissible (at least in
all recognisable, and minimally sensible legal systems). It is plausible that consent can be ‘le-
gally transformative’ without being morally transformative just as it is plausible that consent
can be morally transformative without being legally transformative. The law is after all, at
least sometimes and in some places, an ass.
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What are we to make of this case? Recall the knowledge condition: ‘A has suffi-
cient knowledge of all the facts that are relevant to B’s φ-ing.’ In addition to the
relevant facts listed in the example, here are some more relevant facts: First,
1–4 are very strong reasons in favour of A’s not having the tattoo. Second, 5
and 6 are comparatively very weak reasons in favour of A’s having it. Third, the
combined weight of 1–4 is far greater than the combined weight of 5 and 6. So,
fourth, the balance of reasons favours A’s not getting the tattoo. So, fifth, there
is decisive reason against A’s getting the tattoo. Now, either A knows that there
is decisive reason against having the tattoo or he doesn’t. If A doesn’t know
this then, since this fact is highly relevant to the case, A plausibly fails to satisfy
the knowledge condition and his consenting is not valid. If, on the other hand,
he does know that there is decisive reason against getting the tattoo, but he
consents nonetheless, then he suffers from a form of practical irrationality, he
is weak-willed. But if A is weak-willed, then he does not satisfy the competence
condition.19 So either way, A cannot validly consent to having the tattoo.
Since there is nothing special about Tattoo the point generalises. This sug-
gests, perhaps somewhat surprisingly, that A’s consenting to B’s φ-ing is valid
just in case A’s consenting to B’s φ-ing is in accordance with the balance of rea-
sons for or against B’s φ-ing. But if A can validly consent to B’s φ-ing just in case
A’s consenting is in accordance with the balance of reasons for or against B’s φ-
ing, how can A’s consenting to B’s φ-ing change the normative situation? It’s
very difficult to see what the range of ‘validly consentable’ actions could be. In
what range of cases can T be applied and actually work its moral magic? For sim-
plicity, let us assume that there are no cases where the reasons for and against
B’s φ-ing are exactly balanced. On this assumption, the balance of reasons will
either favour B’s φ-ing or it will favour B’s not-φ-ing. This means that there is
either decisive reason for B’s φ-ing or there is decisive reason against B’s φ-ing.
If there is decisive reason for B’s φ-ing then it is not the case that there is decisive
reason against B’s φ-ing. Let us also assume, again for simplicity, that A either
consents or withholds consent. We have four possibilities here:
(a) There is decisive reason for B’s φ-ing and A withholds consent to B’s φ-ing.
(b) There is decisive reason for B’s φ-ing and A consents to B’s φ-ing.
(c) There is decisive reason against B’s φ-ing and A withholds consent to B’s
φ-ing.
(d) There is decisive reason against B’s φ-ing and A consents to B’s φ-ing.
19 It’s not entirely implausible to suggest that A fails the voluntariness condition as well:
when we act against our better judgment we are manipulating and unduly influencing our-
selves. Even if this manipulation and undue influence is something that is experienced as
alien and unbidden, we are nonetheless being manipulated and unduly influenced.
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So what are the cases in which T can actually be applied? Well, the only cases
that are relevant for T’s application are those in which, prior to A’s valid con-
sent, there is decisive reason against B’s φ-ing (i.e. cases where the balance of
reasons favours B’s not-φ-ing). That means that T has no application in (a)
and (b) – these are cases in which there are decisive consent-independent rea-
sons for B’s φ-ing. T has no application in (c) either since, although there is
decisive reason against B’s φ-ing, A withholds his consent. This leaves (d), but
as we have already seen A’s consent in cases like (d) is invalid (because of ig-
norance or irrationality, or both). We can call this the application problem.
What this problem shows, I think, is that at best, the range of actions to which
A can validly consent is vanishingly small; at worst it shows that there is no
such thing as valid consent as the range of actions to which A can validly con-
sent is empty.
In reply to the argument that T cannot be applied to cases like (d) it might
be argued that the knowledge referred to in the knowledge condition of volun-
tary consent does not include the kind of normative knowledge I have been
talking about. All that’s needed in order to meet this condition is that one
knows all the relevant non-normative facts – like the fact that the tattoo will
be expensive and that it will be permanent, etc. Even if it’s a fact that what is
to count as relevant knowledge is determined by what facts are reasons for or
against consenting, the agent need not have knowledge of this fact. If salient
normative knowledge is unnecessary the charge of irrationality loses all its
traction: one is practically irrational only if one acts contrary to what one be-
lieves the balance of reasons dictates. This is not a plausible response. To start
with, it is unacceptably ad hoc. We need some principled reason why knowl-
edge of this kind should be excluded from the knowledge condition. Even if
some such reason can be provided, this response seems to assume that irratio-
nality is possible only where there is normative ascent: where one has explic-
itly formed a belief about what there is decisive reason to do. So if one does
not have such a belief a charge of irrationality loses all its traction. This is
highly dubious. Normative ascent is not necessary for irrationality. Someone
who knows that getting a facial tattoo will be very expensive, that it will be
very painful, ugly, and permanent and still consents to it is practically irratio-
nal. Such a person either has the tacit belief that these considerations provide
decisive reason against having the tattoo, or he doesn’t. If he does have such a
tacit belief the charge of irrationality remains in full force. If he doesn’t have
such a belief, then whatever we want to say about this person, he or she is cer-
tainly not sufficiently competent.
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Another response to the application problem would be to argue that the
kind of practical irrationality I am accusing A of in cases where he knowingly
acts contrary to the balance of reasons should be excluded from the compe-
tence condition on the grounds that it’s not a severe enough condition to render
him incompetent. But if practical irrationality of this kind is to be excluded
what reason could there be for including things like being depressed, seriously
intoxicated, in excruciating pain, agitated, and irritable etc.? These are in-
cluded in the competence condition precisely because they are likely to cause
an agent to become, among other things, practically irrational.
There may be better responses to the application problem, but since I don’t
know what these are I can’t consider them here. Instead I want to shift focus on
to a bread-and-butter case in the consent literature: the Jehovah’s Witness who
refuses to receive a blood transfusion:
Blood transfusion
Unless A gets a blood transfusion he will die. B is well-placed to administer a quick, safe,
and near enough cost-free transfusion, and A knows this. A refuses to consent on account
of, as he believes, God’s disapproval of blood transfusions.
Many people consider the administering of the blood transfusion impermissible
until the patient consents to the procedure and the transfusion thereby becomes
permissible. For the reasons canvassed above, this is puzzling. But I am going to
put this puzzling feature to the side and focus on a slightly different aspect of
consent: the reasons for and against consenting.
In Blood Transfusion let us suppose that the reasons in favour of B’s admin-
istering the transfusion include the following: A will not experience any of the
pain that he would experience were he not to have the transfusion; A will live
and continue to lead a life that’s well worth living, having many wonderful ex-
periences and accomplishing many worthwhile things; A’s friends and family
will be delighted. These are all very powerful reasons in favour of B’s adminis-
tering the transfusion. Again, let us call B’s administering the transfusion ‘φ’. If,
as we are supposing, it is impermissible for B not to φ there must be reasons
against B’s φ-ing that are strong enough to outweigh the normative force of the
considerations that favour B’s φ-ing. What provides this extraordinarily power-
ful reason or reasons? As I see it, there are only two options here. Either this
reason is a consent-independent reason, or the reason is simply the fact that A
withholds his consent. If A’s consent really does change the normative situation,
it’s very difficult to see how a consent-independent reason (or a set of consent-
independent reasons) against B’s φ-ing could be a decisive reason against B’s φ-
ing. If the decisive reason against B’s φ-ing really were a consent-independent
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reason, then presumably this reason would still obtain after A consents and A’s
consent would not change the balance of reasons. In light of this, if A’s consent
really does change the balance of reasons it must be the fact that he withholds
his consent that provides the decisive reason against B’s φ-ing.
But now we must ask, how is it possible that this could be a reason with
sufficient weight to make it a decisive reason against B’s φ-ing? The fact that A
withholds his consent does not seem to be the right sort of consideration to
play the role of a reason – let alone a decisive reason. Regardless of whether
consenting consists in being in a particular mental state or in performing a
communicative act, consenting and withholding consent are themselves the
sorts of things for which reasons can sensibly be asked and offered. Either
there is reason for A to withhold consent or there isn’t. If there is no reason for
A to withhold consent it’s difficult to see how A’s withholding consent can cre-
ate a decisive reason for B to φ. Such a creation of a decisive reason would
involve an objectionable kind of voluntarism about the normative: it would in-
volve bootstrapping a decisive reason into existence ex nihilo. If, on the other
hand, there is reason to withhold consent, this reason would have to be a con-
sent-independent reason since A’s withholding consenting can’t be a reason
for itself. But if there is consent-independent reason for A to withhold consent
it is equally difficult to see how the fact that A withholds consent adds to the
stock of reasons that obtain independently of his doing so. Supposing then,
that there is a consent-independent reason for A to withhold consent in Blood
Transfusion, what could this reason be?
Again, there seem to be only two alternatives. Either the reason is the fact
that A believes that God disapproves of blood transfusions, or the reason is pro-
vided by the content of A’s belief (that God disapproves of blood transfusions).
It’s implausible that both could be reasons since this would again involve an
objectionable double counting of reasons. Let’s take the second option first.
Once more, there are two options: Either A’s belief is true or it is not. If A’s belief
is false (i.e. his belief has a false proposition as its content) then, aside from the
obvious suspicion that A fails the knowledge condition necessary for valid con-
sent, how can a false proposition provide the relevant reason? There is a robust
consensus among philosophers of normativity that only facts (or fact-like things,
like the obtaining states of affairs perhaps?) provide reasons. So on this option,
there is no reason for A to withhold consent and since this is so his withholding
consent does not provide a decisive reason against B’s φ-ing. The other option
then is that A’s belief is true (i.e. God forbids blood transfusions). But if it is this
consideration that gives A reason to withhold consent, then surely it is this
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consideration that provides the (decisive) reason against B’s φ-ing.20 A’s with-
holding of consent seems entirely redundant – A’s withholding of consent is
merely normatively epiphenomenal.
But what about the first option? Recall that on this option, it is the fact that
A believes that God forbids blood transfusions that is the decisive reason for
A’s withholding consent. Those who endorse this general line of thought are no
doubt more likely to express this by saying that A’s having this belief is part of
A’s deep commitments and forms an essential part of his life plan, and there is
considerable normative pressure on us to respect others’ deep commitments
and life plans. This line of reasoning is not very plausible; it’s certainly implau-
sible if we understand the claim as being content-independently true. We can
easily imagine gangsters and others who have wicked commitments and abhor-
rent life plans. It would be a serious mistake to think that there is a normative
pressure on us to respect such commitments and plans. Nonetheless, for the
sake of argument, let’s grant that we have very powerful reasons to respect peo-
ple’s deep commitments and life plans. Suppose then that A is deeply commit-
ted to his religion and its tenets shape his long term plans, his ambitions, and
the general ways in which he relates to and interacts with other people. The
thought is that administering the blood transfusion is incompatible with show-
ing due respect for A’s deep commitments. But, if we are to respect A’s deep
commitments and such respect can be shown only by not administering the
blood transfusion, then this (presumably decisive) reason obtains indepen-
dently of whether A consents or not. However, like we have seen before, if A
consents to the transfusion, then A has either forgotten about his deep commit-
ments or he is irrational. So A’s consent to the transfusion is not valid and
therefore cannot change the balance of reasons. If on the other hand A with-
holds his consent, his so doing is, again, at best an acknowledgement of the
reasons that obtain independently of his consenting or withholding consent.
Either way, A’s withholding of consent makes no normative difference, and nor
does his consenting.
One line of thought that has not been explored yet appeals to the bad con-
sequences of ignoring consent. Suppose A refuses the transfusion. Imagine
what would happen if B knowingly went ahead and began to administer the
transfusion anyway. Presumably, A would resist in some way and the situation
20 Of course, as Socrates taught us, since there must be an explanation for why God forbids
blood transfusions, it will be the normative reason that will figure in this explanation that pro-
vides A with the real reason for withholding consent and which counts decisively against B’s
φ-ing.
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would turn very ugly. In addition, if, as is very likely, consent is legally transfor-
mative (in the way briefly discussed on p.12 n19) B would no doubt have to face
various legal sanctions, including imprisonment. If B’s job involves performing
blood transfusions he will very likely be fired from his job. It’s very easy to
imagine all sorts of bad things happening to B if he were to attempt to adminis-
ter the transfusion without A’s consent. All these bad things that would happen
to B were he to initiate the procedure without A’s consent are all powerful rea-
sons against (trying to) administer the blood transfusion. But given all this,
does this mean that A’s not consenting provides a powerful reason against B’s
administering the transfusion? No, it doesn’t. A’s not consenting is at best an
enabling condition for the obtaining of reasons against administering the trans-
fusion. What counts against B’s φ-ing is the fact that bad things will happen to
him if he φs. Of course, those bad things would not happen if A consents (i.e.
those reasons would not obtain were A to consent), but this does in no way
show that A’s withholding of consent itself provide reasons against B’s φ-ing. If
B φs without obtaining A’s consent A may well feel violated in various ways by
this and the explanation for his so feeling will of course be that B φs without
obtaining his consent. But this does not show that A’s withholding of consent
is a reason against B’s φ-ing either. Rather, B’s φ-ing without A’s consent is
what enables there to be reasons against B’s φ-ing.
I’ll end this paper by briefly discussing two ways in which consent might
be normative after all. The first is that A’s withholding of consent may provide
B with reason to believe that there is reason against his φ-ing. I say ‘may’ be-
cause it seems likely that the epistemic status of A’s withholding consent needs
to be settled by considerations that arise in the epistemology of testimony. A’s
withholding of consent may, in many contexts, reasonably be thought of as A’s
testifying that there are strong reasons against his φ-ing. This line of thought
naturally inherits all the complexities of the epistemology of testimony, so I
will not say anything more about this line of thought – save one thing: Even if
A’s withholding of consent is good reason to believe that there is reason against
φ-ing, since the fact that there is reason to believe that p does not entail p, A’s
withholding consent does not entail that there is reason against φ-ing.
There are many things we have reason to care about and to protect. We all
have good reason to care about ourselves and others and to protect ourselves
and others from being exploited, manipulated, coerced, deceived, and in other
ways used as mere means. However, given our limited altruism, our less than
perfect knowledge, and our general moral fallibility, there is excellent reason
for us to create and maintain legal and social institutions that protect the dig-
nity and interests of all against our own moral and epistemic shortcomings.
That we should require people’s consent before we can permissibly – in a legal
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and social sense – act in various ways with respect to one another is one of the
best ways we have to ensure that people’s dignity and interests are to the great-
est feasible extent protected. This is an unashamedly instrumental approach to
consent: creating and maintaining legal and social institutions of this kind ar-
guably serves that very worthwhile goal better than any other feasible alterna-
tive. So there is excellent reason to create and maintain institutions that place
consent at the centre of many of our interactions with each other. This still
doesn’t show that consent itself is normatively transformative.
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